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The New International Financial Architecture: 
Bail-ins, Bail-outs, Bail-ups and Newspeak 
George Fane  
T he term ‘bailing in the private sector’ is used to describe several quite different proposals with the common feature that they all seek to make private lenders to developing countries share in the costs of financial or 
currency crises in these countries.  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
regards it as one of the main pillars of the ‘new international financial 
architecture’ — that is, the package of proposals for reforming the international 
financial system that is intended to reduce the frequency and severity of financial 
and currency crises in emerging markets.  The other pillars of the IMF’s proposed 
package are transparency, prudential regulation of financial institutions, cautious 
liberalisation of international capital markets and the implementation of codes of 
international best practice for making and documenting economic policies.   
There are three main groups of proposals for bailing in the private sector:  
 
1. Governments or central banks in developing countries should explicitly 
purchase insurance against financial and currency crises from private financial 
institutions in international capital markets.  There are already some examples 
of developing countries that have negotiated a contingent credit line (CCL) with 
major international banks that can be drawn down in specified circumstances.  
Alternatively, some bond contracts might contain clauses that would 
automatically trigger reduced repayment, or perhaps even increased new 
lending, in certain specified adverse circumstances for the borrower.  The rarity 
of explicit insurance against financial and currency crises probably reflects the 
difficulty of defining such crises with enough precision to make insurance 
contracts legally enforceable.  There is broad agreement in econometric studies 
that financial crises involve widespread bank failures, and currency crises 
involve both large increases in short-term interest rates and either large losses of 
foreign exchange reserves, or large exchange rate depreciation, or both.  
However, these circumstances depend either on subjective judgements, or on 
variables that could be readily manipulated by a central bank. 
2. To make it easier for developing country governments to force private creditors 
to concede partial forgiveness of debts in a crisis, the IMF should sometimes 
‘lend into arrears’ — that is, it should lend to countries that are in default on 
contracted debt service payments to banks or private bond holders.  During the 
Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, the IMF refrained from lending to 
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countries in arrears to private creditors, but it began to do so in 1989, and further 
extended the conditions under which it was willing to do so in 1999.   
3. The IMF and G-7 governments should promote the use of collective action 
clauses in sovereign bond contracts.1 These clauses make it easier for a super-
majority of bondholders to overrule objections from the remainder to a proposal 
by the debtor to reduce, or postpone, contracted debt service payments. 
 
These proposals all seek to make foreign private lenders to emerging markets 
provide some form of insurance against financial and currency crises, but differ 
radically in the extent to which this insurance is explicitly contracted for in advance 
of a crisis.  The first group of proposals seeks to encourage the development of 
market mechanisms that allow countries to buy insurance in advance of a crisis.  In 
contrast, the second group seeks to force private foreign lenders to provide insurance 
pay-outs in the event of a crisis, despite never having explicitly contracted to do so 
in advance.  The third group contains elements of both the previous ones.   
It is argued here that proposals of the first type, which encourage countries to 
purchase insurance against financial and currency crises, are potentially sensible but 
are unlikely to achieve much.  The effectiveness of such insurance is constrained by 
moral hazard and by the difficulty of designing contracts that unambiguously 
specify the event being insured against.  There is little that governments or the IMF 
can do to ease these constraints.  In contrast, proposals of the second type, which 
seek to force private lenders to provide insurance without having contracted to do so 
have nothing to recommend them.  These are the proposals referred to here as ‘bail-
ups’, since in the absence of explicit insurance contracts lenders will not willingly 
provide insurance.  Once bail-ups are anticipated, foreign lenders will demand an 
interest rate premium for the implicit insurance services that they are being forced to 
bundle with their loans.  The result will be increased borrowing costs for all 
developing countries and the crowding out of more efficient forms of insurance.   
A minor theme of this article is that although the IMF and the other official 
financial architects regularly describe transparency as one of the main pillars of the 
new financial architecture, they apparently feel that in the case of their own 
transparency it is possible to have too much of a good thing.  This article gives 
several examples of lack of transparency in IMF and other official attempts to help 
developing country governments to renege on private debts.  ‘Reneging’ on a debt is 
used here to describe what happens when the terms of a loan contract are changed to 
the permanent disadvantage of the lender.  It differs from ‘default’ only because the 
lenders may reluctantly agree to proposed contractual amendments if the expected 
gains from taking legal action to enforce the original contract are less than the 
expected costs.   
Their lack of transparency indicates that the IMF and the other official 
architects are slightly ashamed of undermining loan contracts between developing 
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country governments and private foreign lenders.  In order to gloss over the fact that 
they are doing so, IMF and other official reports use terms like ‘orderly restructuring 
of debts’, ‘rescheduling of debts’ and ‘temporary suspension of debt service 
payments’ to describe reneging by governments on their contracted debt service 
payments.  It is logically possible to change the terms of a debt contract without 
disadvantaging the creditor.  But in practice, restructuring, rescheduling and 
temporary suspension of debt service by countries hit by a financial or currency 
crisis almost always cause permanent losses to creditors.  The reason is that the 
sovereign risk premiums that markets apply to new loans to such countries are far in 
excess of the interest rates offered by reneging countries.  If the amendments 
proposed by the debtor were really sufficient to compensate the creditors for all the 
risks that they face, there would be no need for restructuring, rescheduling, or 
suspension of existing loans, since the debtor’s cash flow problems could be met by 
completely new borrowing.   
‘Orderly restructuring’, ‘rescheduling of debts’ and ‘temporary suspension of 
debt service payments’, therefore, are all examples of Orwellian Newspeak.  That is, 
they are jargon invented to camouflage reneging on debts by creating the false 
impression that lenders do not suffer permanent losses.  The term ‘new international 
financial architecture’, is another example of Newspeak, since it creates the 
impression that the proposed plans are well designed and structurally sound. 
Purchasing Insurance Against Financial and Currency Crises 
A 1998 report of the Group of 22 (G-22)2 proposed that sovereign bond issues 
should contain clauses requiring bondholders to accept reduced repayments, or 
even provide new loans, in specified adverse circumstances for the debtor country.  
In effect, such clauses would amount to the purchase of insurance by debtor 
governments from bondholders.  This has the merit, relative to ‘bailing-up’ 
proposals, that the provision of insurance would be made explicit in the contract.  
Unfortunately, it is likely to be impracticable.  Official bodies, like the G-22, can 
make the proposal, but since bond contracts are certainly not the least cost way of 
providing insurance, it is unlikely that private bondholders would be willing to 
offer such contracts at interest rates acceptable to the governments and central 
banks of debtor countries.   
Another way in which a developing country can buy insurance against financial 
and currency crises is for its central bank to arrange a CCL from international banks 
that can be drawn down in specified circumstances.  Argentina, Mexico and 
Indonesia have already done this, and Indonesia and Argentina have already made 
use of their credit lines.  The obvious similarity between this and the G-22 proposal 
raises the question why some lines of credit have been arranged, whereas bond 
contracts providing for reduced repayments in certain circumstances have not.  One 
possible answer is that a line of credit can provide insurance against crises without 
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the need to explicitly define what constitutes a crisis.  If the contract establishing the 
line of credit specifies an interest rate above that at which the country could borrow 
in normal circumstances, but below the almost prohibitive rates that a country 
experiencing a financial or currency crisis would have to offer to attract new 
lending, it will only be in the borrower’s interest to make use of the credit line if a 
crisis occurs.  A second possible answer is that the fact that only two countries have 
ever used CCLs indicates that they too do not work very well.   
Transparency and Official Encouragement of Default 
The Mexican and Asian crises demonstrated that the IMF has become an 
international lender of last resort.  It performs this role in conjunction with the US 
government, the other members of the G-7 and the Paris Club of official 
creditors.3 The IMF is an agent of these richest countries, since they largely 
finance it and have a dominant influence on the Executive Board that controls its 
policies. 
There are now several examples of last resort loans being made to countries 
that are in arrears to private creditors and even examples of official demands that 
debtor governments force private bondholders to accept ‘rescheduling of debts’ as a 
condition for last resort loans.  The New York based Emerging Markets Traders 
Association (EMTA) states that in early 1999 ‘reports began to circulate that the 
IMF had requested Romania to roll over upcoming Eurobond payments’ and that in 
February 1999, the Paris Club demanded that Pakistan reschedule its Eurobonds as a 
condition for a rescheduling of official debt (EMTA, 1999).  Ukraine, while under 
an IMF program, rescheduled debt service obligations in a unilateral fashion in 1998 
and 1999 before reaching agreement with private bondholders in 2000.  According 
to the Financial Times (1999), ‘Ecuador’s recent default on its Eurobonds has been 
quietly welcomed in official circles’.  Warburg Dillon Read (1999) commented that 
the timing of the announcement of Ecuador’s default on its Eurobonds and Brady 
bonds, ‘just a day before President Mahuad was due to announce an agreement with 
the IMF, raises the suspicion that the IMF was in fact requiring initiation of Brady 
restructuring as a pre-condition of the agreement.  Warburg Dillon Read (1999) also 
stated that:  
 
Ecuador’s loud and frequent assertions that the country is acting with 
the full support of the IMF, the World Bank, the IDB, the US Treasury 
and President Clinton (but not so far, the Pope) has not met with any 
official denial, and is apparently true. 
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A recent IMF (2001) Issues Brief states that:  
 
In some sense, the IMF already gives moral support to some standstills 
by agreeing to lend to countries that are in arrears to their private 
creditors, as long as they are negotiating with those creditors in good 
faith to reach a collaborative agreement. 
 
It is disingenuous of the IMF to imply that its practice of lending to countries 
that are in arrears to private creditors gives only ‘moral’ support to debtors that 
unilaterally suspend contracted debt service payments.  The difficulty of forcing 
debtor governments to honour their contracts used to be ameliorated by the IMF’s 
refusal to lend into arrears; its new willingness to lend into arrears has therefore 
removed part of the underpinning of sovereign bond contracts.  While the IMF 
cannot prevent private bondholders from taking legal actions to enforce contracts, it 
can exert enormous influence on a debtor’s decision to renege on debts, or to repay 
them in full.  The reason for this is that Paris Club agreements to reschedule debts 
are normally conditional on the debtor government satisfying the IMF that it is 
keeping to the terms of an IMF economic policy program.  Whether the IMF 
approves or condemns a debtor government’s policies on repayment of private debts 
is therefore crucial to obtaining the support of the Paris Club.  This in turn is of vital 
importance to a debtor government, since the Paris Club’s principles of consensus 
and solidarity make it a cartel of the world’s largest and richest lenders. 
A report for the Group of 104 (1996) stated that IMF lending into arrears would 
‘improve the bargaining position of the debtor substantially’ and would ‘signal to 
the unpaid creditors that their interests are best served by quickly reaching an 
agreement with the debtor.’ This report is itself disingenuous.  It pays lip service to 
the view that ‘it is essential to maintain the basic principles that the terms and 
conditions of all debt contracts are to be met in full and that market discipline must 
be preserved’, but nevertheless supports IMF lending to countries in arrears to their 
private creditors, despite arguing that such lending substantially strengthens the 
bargaining position of the debtor in default.   
Reports by the IMF and other official bodies treat transparency as a cardinal 
virtue.  It is ironic, therefore, that the Financial Times should refer to Ecuador’s 
default being ‘quietly welcomed’ in official circles, and that such major (and 
therefore presumably well informed) players as the (EMTA) and Warburg Dillon 
Read should have to use phrases like ‘reports began to circulate’ and ‘is apparently 
true’, to describe alleged IMF encouragement of Ecuador’s default.  The EMTA 
(2000) has complained that: 
 
What is surprising to us after months of consultation between the 
private sector and official creditors is the comparatively little effort on 
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the part of official creditors to clarify the application of private burden 
sharing and the Paris Club principle of Comparability. 
 
Like all virtues, transparency is easier to recommend to others than to apply 
to oneself.   
Two potential justifications for official encouragement of reneging by 
governments on private debts are sometimes offered:  
 
1. that it helps to reduce moral hazard; and  
2. that it helps to ensure comparability of treatment between private and official 
creditors.   
 
The next two sections demonstrate the inadequacy of these attempted 
justifications.  A possible alternative explanation for the official community’s 
desire to force private lenders to provide ex post crisis insurance to developing 
countries is that the revenue from this implicit tax on lending does not appear on 
the budgets of the G-7 governments.  Rather, it automatically reduces the explicit 
cost to the IMF, and therefore to the G-7 governments, of financing bail-outs.  If, 
instead, the full costs of such bail-outs were met only by the IMF, its resources 
would have to be supplemented by explicit transfers of on-budget revenue, which 
would have to come mainly from the G-7 countries.  Persuading their 
governments, and in particular the US Congress, to further expand the funds 
available to the IMF by raising taxes or reducing other expenditures would be 
extremely difficult.  This provides another example of official policy seeking to 
avoid being transparent. 
Moral Hazard and Excessive Risk Taking 
An argument that is frequently made in favour of making private bondholders 
share in the cost of financial crises is that doing so reduces excessive risk taking 
and moral hazard.5  The argument is that if bondholders are always repaid in full, 
they have no incentive to check on the borrower’s ability to repay, and will lend to 
finance excessively risky projects.  Of course, this is similar to the argument that 
can be made against government provision of guarantees or compulsory insurance 
of deposits in commercial banks.  However, for a given readiness of official last 
resort lenders to provide bail-outs, it is likely that making it easier for a 
government to renege on its private debts would increase, rather than reduce, 
moral hazard and excessive risk taking. 
Moral hazard and excessive risk taking might indeed be reduced if bailing-in 
the private sector were used to reduce the size of official bail-outs.  However, this 
merely provides a justification for encouraging governments of developing countries 
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to find ways of insuring themselves against adverse events.  It does not justify 
forcing lenders to provide an inefficient form of insurance that would tend to crowd 
out more efficient forms.  Since loans are less likely to be repaid in full when a 
debtor is in financial difficulty, it is inevitable that lending and insurance are 
bundled to some extent.  If the IMF and the G-7 governments undermine attempts 
by foreign private lenders to enforce the terms of contracts against governments that 
have been hit by financial or currency crises, they increase the extent to which all 
private lending must be bundled with de facto insurance (in the form of the 
borrower’s ability to renege on its originally contracted repayments in adverse, but 
imprecisely specified circumstances).  Because this form of insurance is opaque and 
can be manipulated by the borrower, it is likely to be much less efficient.  Therefore, 
it is ultimately more costly for the borrower than negotiating a CCL or holding high 
foreign exchange reserves. 
Comparability of Burden Sharing 
The Paris Club tries to insist on the principle of comparability between private and 
official creditors in the sharing of the burden of partial default by debtor countries.  
This principle does not prevent loans by the IMF and World Bank, which are 
agents of the Paris Club governments, from being given precedence over the 
claims of private and other official lenders.  For example, in writing about 
Ecuador’s default on its Brady bonds, Warburg Dillon Read (1999) stated that ‘we 
can be sure that the IMF and multilateral debt (roughly $4.5 billion of the total 
[$16 billion of public domestic and external debt]) will not be rescheduled in any 
way’.   
The Paris Club governments do not apply the principle of comparability in the 
context of domestic last resort lending by their own central banks.  Although such 
lending regularly involves them in large losses, central banks do not propose that 
other creditors of the banks receiving last resort loans must forgive part of what they 
are owed.  Nor is the principle of comparability applied to IMF-financed bail-outs of 
depositors in failed commercial banks.  In the Mexican and Asian crises, the IMF 
did not recommend that part of the bail-out costs should be met by discouraging 
other bank creditors from taking normal legal actions to recover what was owed to 
them.  Quite to the contrary, the IMF has insisted on the benefits of reforming 
national bankruptcy laws to strengthen the ability of creditors to enforce loan 
contracts against recalcitrant debtors. 
Paris Club rescheduling of the debts of governments that experience crises is a 
form of last resort lending.  It is also influenced by political considerations and is 
clearly not a normal commercial transaction.  The fact that the official community 
may decide to bail out developing country governments whose survival is important 
to G-7 governments, or to extend last resort loans that are intended to preserve the 
stability of the international financial system, rather than to be profitable in narrowly 
commercial terms, is therefore not a valid reason for weakening the enforceability of 
normal commercial contracts.  In the unlikely event that they can be justified at all, 
the costs of bail-outs undertaken by governments for strategic reasons, and of 
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official last resort lending designed to prevent systemic financial failures, should be 
met out of general tax revenue and paid for by small increases in all taxes, rather 
than by trying to finance most of it by the extremely inefficient method of 
undermining contractual rights. 
Collective Action Clauses 
Collective action clauses, which make it possible for the borrower to change the 
amounts to be repaid if 75 per cent or 90 per cent of bondholders agree to the 
proposal, have been advocated as being in the interest of most bondholders, as 
well as the borrower.6  This argument is often based on an analogy to Chapter 11 
of the US Bankruptcy Code — once a firm is in financial difficulty, it may well be 
in the interest of individual creditors to seize its assets at the earliest opportunity, 
even if doing so can be expected to reduce the total repayments made to all 
creditors as a group.  Chapter 11 provisions can be used to prevent such a creditor 
grab.  In the absence of an international bankruptcy court, the advocates of 
collective action clauses argue that they are needed ‘to discourage maverick 
investors from resorting to lawsuits and other ways of obstructing settlements 
beneficial to the debtor and the majority of creditors’ (Eichengreen and Mody, 
2000). 
From the point of view of most bondholders, the actions of the maverick 
investors are indeed harmful if they so exacerbate the debtor’s situation that total 
repayments are reduced.  There is however, a second collective action problem 
facing private bondholders — the problem of coordinating resistance to attempts by 
borrowers to obtain partial debt forgiveness in circumstances in which full 
repayment is possible.  A majority of bondholders may be willing to accept partial 
debt forgiveness if each believes that legal action is costly and unlikely to succeed.  
But, even if a few firms are ready to take legal action if not repaid in full, the 
borrower may be deterred from ever attempting to obtain partial forgiveness.  By 
making it harder for a few bondholders to resist an attempt by the borrower to obtain 
partial debt forgiveness in adverse circumstances, collective action clauses may 
exacerbate this second collective action problem.   
Eichengreen and Mody have investigated the effects of collective action 
clauses on the cost of borrowing by comparing the yields on bonds issued under US 
governing law that requires unanimous agreement of bondholders to any proposal 
for altering the terms of a bond to extend the repayment period, or to reduce the 
amount to be repaid, with those issued under British governing law that sometimes 
include collective action clauses.  After controlling for factors that might affect the 
likelihood that a borrower will default, Eichengreen and Mody divide their sample 
into two roughly equal halves, according to the borrower’s credit rating.  They 
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estimate that sovereign borrowers with poor credit ratings have to pay a premium of 
about 130 basis points (1.3 percent per year) if they issue bonds containing 
collective action clauses, but that those with relatively good credit ratings can reduce 
the interest rate that they have to pay by about 50 basis points (0.5 percent per year) 
by including collective action clauses.   
Eichengreen and Mody interpret their results as implying that the prevention of 
creditor grabs does indeed increase the total amounts that bondholders are likely to 
recover in the event that full repayment of debts is impossible.  They suggest that 
this is the dominant effect in the case of bonds issued by borrowers with relatively 
high credit ratings.  But in the case of investors with relatively poor credit ratings, 
the dominant effect is ‘the moral hazard and default risk associated with 
renegotiation-friendly loan provisions’ (Eichengreen and Mody, 2000:3).  They do 
not explain what type of moral hazard they have in mind.  However, since they 
argue that the inclusion of collective action clauses raises the interest rate demanded 
by lenders to such countries, it must reduce the total amount that bondholders expect 
to be repaid.  Their rationale must presumably be something very like the second 
type of collective action problem described above; namely, that the ease of 
preventing litigation by some disgruntled bondholders makes it easier for a 
borrower, perhaps encouraged by the IMF and the Paris Club, to force all 
bondholders to accept partial forgiveness of debts even if full repayment would have 
been possible.   
Eichengreen and Mody’s econometric evidence is itself open to question.  
Since debt rescheduling is very rare for sovereign borrowers with relatively high 
credit ratings, it is hard to believe that collective action clauses, which can only be 
relevant in the event of rescheduling, can really reduce interest rates by 50 basis 
points.  This is larger than most estimates of the entire country risk premium for the 
Australian government relative to the World Bank or the US Treasury.  A 
communiqué of the G-10 (2000) states that in January 2000, the UK included a 
majority-action clause in its euro-denominated treasury note program and that this 
had no discernible effect on price or liquidity.  A study by Becker, Richards and 
Thaicharoen (2000) controls for a wider range of variables than that used by 
Eichengreen and Mody and concludes that collective action clauses have little or no 
discernible effects on bond yields in secondary markets. 
If, as seems to be the case, collective action clauses have little or no effect on 
the interest rates, then their widespread adoption would do little either to raise or to 
lower efficiency.  Alternatively, if Eichengreen and Mody’s econometric results are 
correct, the implication is that borrowers with relatively good credit ratings should 
adopt these clauses, but that moral hazard would be exacerbated if they were 
adopted by relatively high-risk borrowers.  For obvious reasons, the borrowers with 
the best credit ratings pose few problems for the international financial system.  
Proposals to strengthen it, therefore, have focused on reducing the likelihood of 
default by high-risk borrowers.  It follows that their results, even if they were 
correct, would not justify their Panglossian conclusion that collective action clauses 
are ‘an important element in the campaign to strengthen the international financial 
architecture’ (Eichengreen and Mody, 2000:abstract).   
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Conclusion 
Proposals that governments of developing countries should insure against 
financial crises by arranging CCLs from major international banks is sensible 
enough, but somewhat empty.  So far, only two countries have ever used CCLs from 
international banks.  If they are such a good idea, why are such credit lines so rarely 
used, and what is to be done if more countries do not take out such insurance? In 
part, the apparent lack of interest in credit lines may reflect the fact that they are a 
close substitute for the foreign currency reserves that all central banks hold in the 
form of money at call in the major international financial centres.  In part, it may 
also be that the willingness of the IMF and the G-7 governments to bail out 
governments facing financial crises reduces the incentives for these countries either 
to hold large reserves, or to negotiate insurance contracts that are close substitutes 
for them.  This possibility is supported by the fact that the two governments with the 
largest ratio of reserves to GDP are those of Hong Kong and Taiwan, which are not 
members of the IMF.  The G-22 Report’s proposal for clauses in bond contracts to 
provide for reduced repayments in specified circumstances is similar in aim to the 
proposal for CCLs from international banks, but would be even harder to implement 
in practice. 
There are two main objections to bailing up private lenders by having the IMF, 
or G-7 governments, provide support to governments that suspend debt service 
payments to private bondholders.  First, the real conditions that govern bond 
contracts, as opposed to the nominal conditions, become obscured and ambiguous.  
Second, negotiating CCLs with international banks appears to be a less inefficient 
way for governments to buy insurance than issuing bonds containing explicit, let 
alone implicit and ambiguous, conditions for reduced debt service payments in 
adverse circumstances.   
The IMF and G-7 governments could answer both the above objections to 
bailing in by proposing a new form of bond contract, which would specify that debt 
service payments would be suspended for the duration of a ‘declared financial 
crisis’, and that the maturity of the bonds would be extended by the duration of the 
crisis.  The IMF would be the arbiter of when a crisis started and when it ended.  It 
would be easy to design more elaborate contracts that provided for different 
adjustments in response to the intensity of the crisis, as judged by the IMF.  This 
proposal would offer a more efficient form of insurance than the current proposals 
for bailing in private bondholders by lending into arrears because the contracts 
would be relatively unambiguous and transparent.  Of course, such contracts might 
never be used.  Even though they would dominate the existing IMF bailing in 
proposals in terms of efficiency and transparency, the interest rate premium 
demanded by lenders for the insurance provided would probably be so high that few, 
if any, borrowers would be willing to pay it.  Proposals to bail up private 
bondholders avoid this potential embarrassment for the new architects by forcing all 
bond contracts into a mould that is even less efficient than one that would probably 
be rejected by almost all borrowers and lenders if they were allowed to choose. 
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